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Casenotes
NO MORE CLOWNING AROUND: RINGLING BROS.-BARNUM
& BAILEY COMBINED SHOWS, INC. v. UTAH DIVISION OF
TRAVEL DEVELOPMENT EVALUATES THE FEDERAL
TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
"If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we
purchase goods by them. A trade-mark [sic] is a merchandising
short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or
what he has been led to believe he wants."' Trademark owners
bring suits primarily to protect a mark's unique character and to
keep competitors from using the mark to obtain profits that the
original owner would otherwise have gained. 2 Courts began to pro-
tect trademarks used in commerce by providing a cause of action
based on a "likelihood of confusion" standard. 3 This early standard
marked the start of protection from dilution - "the lessening of the
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or ser-
vices." 4 Until 1995, dilution protection consisted of varying state
anti-dilution standards. 5 Differing state anti-dilution standards cre-
ated a call for statutory uniformity that would offer more predict-
able protection.6 Congress responded by enacting the Federal
1. Patrick M. Bible, Defining and Quantifying Dilution Under the Federal Trade-
mark Dilution Act of 1995: Using Survey Evidence to Show Actual Dilution, 70 U. CoLo.
L. REv. 295, 299 (1999) (quoting Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S.
Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942)). In Mishawaka, Justice Frankfurter stated
that the "protection of trade-marks [sic] is the law's recognition of the psychologi-
cal function of symbols." Mishawaka, 316 U.S. at 205.
2. See Bible, supra note 1, at 296-97. The author also noted that traditional
theory of trademark dilution is based on the "ground that a party has a valuable
interest in the good-will of his trade or business, and in the trade-marks [sic]
adopted to maintain and extend it." Id. (quoting Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Met-
.... , 2110 U.S. 403, 412 (1916)).
3. See id. at 295. This standard protects original ("senior") mark owners from
competitors who use junior marks to deceive consumers, rob sales from the origi-
nal owners and gain profits. See id.
4. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev. ("Ringling II"), 170 F.3d 449, 452 (4th Cir. 1999). For further discus-
sion of dilution, see infra note 33 and accompanying text.
5. See Bible, supra note 1, at 300-01 (outlining history of state anti-dilution
standards and describing standards as "scattered" and "inconsistent").
6. See id. at 301.
(279)
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Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (the "Act"). 7 The Act requires
proof of "actual dilution," which is arguably more stringent than
the state statutes' "likelihood of dilution" standard.8 Recently, the
Fourth Circuit held in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development9 that the Act re-
quires proof of actual economic harm to a famous mark's value by a
lessening of the mark's selling power and that "actual economic
harm" does not encompass the "likelihood of dilution" standard.' 0
This decision brought the issue of trademark dilution under the
Act into the public eye." This case involves a dilution suit brought
by Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Circus, the "Greatest Show on
Earth" for over a century, and a source of entertainment for mil-
lions across the nation.' 2 Trademark protection is critical in the
entertainment industry, where the item being sold is not a tangible
product but a program or show that must rely heavily on its
image. 13
Part II of this Note introduces the parties and facts of
Ringling.14 Part III reviews the jurisprudential and legislative his-
tory preceding the case. 15 Part IV examines the Fourth Circuit's
opinion in Ringling, and Part V critically analyzes the Fourth Cir-
7. See id. at 301-02.
8. See id. at 307. But see id. at 308 (recognizing that although "the 'causes
dilution' language in the Act suggests an actual dilution standard, some contend
that the 'causes dilution' standard in the Act encompasses the likelihood of dilu-
tion standard").
9. 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 923 (1999).
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. For a discussion of Ringling's use of its mark, see infra notes 20-24 and
accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Gilbert Nicholson, ESPN Suing CSPN Over Trademark, BIRM. Bus. J.,
July 26, 1999, at 1. "ESPN . .. CSPN ... sound familiar? Well, ESPN thinks so
.... " Id. ESPN, a major cable sports network brought a federal suit under New
York law against CSPN, a southern local cable network in a New York federal court
because CSPN's mark (CSPN) was so similar to ESPN that it would likely dilute
ESPN's mark ("ESPN") or cause confusion for viewers who are likely to assume a
relationship between CSPN and ESPN. See id.; see also Chris Koseluk & Noe Gold,
Over My Dead Body, HOLLYWOOD REP., Feb. 9, 1999, at 16. The article points out
that "reselling Hollywood has become big business." Koseluk & Gold, supra, at 18.
According to Christopher Nassif, owner of Christopher Nassif Agency & Associates,
a talent agency, "[e]very aspect of a personality's image is controllable by that per-
son." Id. In fact, some celebrities have trademarked their images and used the
Lanham Act to protect those images. See id.
14. For a discussion of the facts of RinglingII, see infra notes 18-33 and accom-
panying text.
15. For a discussion of the relevant law leading up to Ringling II, see infra
notes 34-78 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 7: p. 279
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cuit's holding in Ringling.1 6 Finally, Part VI discusses the likely ef-
fect of Ringling on future cases involving trademark dilution. 17
II. FACTS
Since 1872, Ringling has been entertaining the public with cir-
cus shows advertised as the "Greatest Show on Earth" ("Greatest
Show").18 Each year, Ringling travels and presents its show to ap-
proximately twelve million people across the nation.1 9 In 1961,
Ringling received federal trademark registration for the Greatest
Show mark.20 Due to substantial advertising, more than seventy
million people have been exposed to the Greatest Show mark in
connection with the circus. 21 For the fiscal year ending in January
1997, revenues derived from goods and services bearing the Great-
est Show mark exceeded $103 million. 22 Advertising expenditures
using the mark totaled approximately $19 million. 23 The Greatest
Show mark itself receives substantial free advertising because of its
renown.
24
Utah Division of Travel Development, an agency of the state of
Utah, has been using the "Greatest Snow on Earth" ("Greatest
Snow") mark since at least 1962 in connection with Utah tourism
services. 25 The Utah Ski Association also uses the Greatest Snow
mark in its promotion of the state's tourism. 26 Utah advertises tour-
ism using the Greatest Snow mark primarily on motor vehicle li-
16. For a discussion and critique of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Ringling
II, see infra notes 79-141 and accompanying text.
17. For a prediction of the effect Ringling II will have on future trademark
case law, see infra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
18. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev. ("Ringling I"), 955 F. Supp. 605, 609 (E.D. Va. 1997).
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.; see also Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Utah D;v. of T.avel Dev. /"Ringtlinrg I) 170 F.rl 44 451 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting
that Ringling advertises its circus using Greatest Show mark in print advertising,
radio, television, videos, outdoor billboards, direct-mail pieces, press announce-
ments, posters, program books, souvenirs, and joint promotions with other compa-
nies). The court also noted that Ringling gains additional exposure through joint
promotion with retailers. See id.
22. See Ringling I, 955 F. Supp. at 609.
23. See id. at 610.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 611.
26. See id.
20001
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cense plates, but the mark is also used in print advertising.27 Utah's
budget for winter advertising, which includes advertising the Great-
est Snow mark, has ranged from $300,000 to $450,000 annually for
the past fifteen years.28 In 1975, Utah registered its mark with the
state of Utah, ten years after the Utah Attorney General decided
that Utah's mark did not impair or violate Ringling's Greatest Show
mark.2 9 Utah applied for federal registration for its mark over
Ringling's objections and was granted this registration on January
21, 1997. 30
Ringling commenced an action against Utah on June 6, 1996,
alleging the Greatest Snow mark "diluted" Ringling's Greatest Show
mark and sought monetary and injunctive relief.3 1 The district
court held that Ringling failed to show dilution by "blurring."32 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court decision that Ringling had not estab-
lished dilution under the Act.3 3
III. BACKGROUND
Traditional trademark theory is based on the idea that "a party
has a valuable interest in the good-will of his trade or business, and
in the trademarks adopted to maintain and extend it."3 4 Courts
protected parties from defendants' unauthorized use of trademarks
by allowing plaintiffs to demonstrate that consumers were likely to
confuse sources of defendants' products with sources of plaintiffs'
27. See Ringling I, 170 F.3d at 451 (explaining that Utah has used its mark in
magazine advertisements every year from 1962 to present except 1963, 1977 and
1989).
28. See Ringling I, 955 F. Supp. at 611; see also Ringling II, 170 F.3d at 451.
29. See Ringling II, 170 F.3d at 451. The court also noted that Utah renewed
state registration in 1985 and again in 1995. See id.
30. See Ringling 1, 955 F. Supp. at 611.
31. See id. at 613.
32. See id. at 605, 622. Before trial, Utah moved to strike Ringling's request
forjury trial. See id. The district court granted the motion and, after a bench trial,
found for Utah. See id. at 609. For a discussion of blurring, see infra notes 64-65
and accompanying text.
33. See Ringling II, 170 F.3d at 449, 451; see also I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler
Co., 163 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 1998). Dilution is "the lessening of the capacity of a
famous mark to identify and distinguish good [sic] or services." Id. at 48 (quoting
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1996)).
34. Bible, supra note 1, at 296-97. For a discussion of trademark dilution the-
ory, see Bible, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 7: p. 279
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products.35 The Lanham Act3 6 codified this trademark theory, of-
fering protection against defendants' use that is "likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive."3 7 Dilution theories
differ from traditional trademark theory in the area of infringe-
ment, however, in that infringement concerns competing parties'
trademarks, while dilution concerns non-competing parties'
trademarks.38
Although trademark dilution originated in German and En-
glish courts, Professor Frank I. Schechter introduced the concept to
the United States. 39 Schechter proposed the idea that "confusion"
should not be applied universally to trademark protection ac-
tions.40 He suggested that the value of a trademark lies in its "sell-
ing power" and that injury to the owner's trademark constituted the
"gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon
the public mind of the mark or name. '41 Though Schechter's
"whittling away" theory was not incorporated into the Lanham Act,
it did influence common law unfair competition claims, and, as a
35. See Bible, supra note 1, at 297. Courts devised this standard with the trade-
mark owner's reputation and good-will in mind, and realizing that a trademark
owner's primary motivation in bringing a trademark suit was to prevent a competi-
tor from infringing the mark in an effort to gain profits that would otherwise be-
long to the owner. See id. at 296-97; see also Elliot B. Staffin, The Dilution Doctrine:
Towards a Reconciliation With the Lanham Act, 6 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 105, 156-57 (1995). Staffin explains that "subliminal confusion" is the
best theory to describe situations triggering dilution doctrine: "[T]his phenome-
non requires an extremely strong mark, which will invite unauthorized uses to con-
jure up unconscious associations of quality and reliability. However, these
associations properly refer to - and belong only - to the senior mark holder and its
business." Id. at 157. For example, a customer may not be consciously confused by
a senior mark used on a non-competing, unrelated product, but may be induced
to buy it because of subliminal associations triggered by the similar mark. See id.
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1057-1128 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
37. Bible, supra note 1, at 297 (citing Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)
(1994)). This act did not offer a remedy for dilution. See Staffin, supra note 35, at
106.
38. See Nike Inc. v. Nike Sec., L.P., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1202, 1204 (N.D. 111. 1999)
(holding that application of Act to trademark use prior to 1995 constitutes im-
proper retroactive application of statute).
39. See Bible, supra note 1, at 297 (citing Frank i. Schechter, The Rational Basi3
of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REv. 813 (1927)).
40. See Schechter, supra note 39, at 814-19.
41. Id. at 831; see also Susan L. Serad, One Year After Dilution's Enty Into Federal
Trademark Law, 32 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 215, 217 (1997) (quoting Madrid Protocol
Implementation Act and Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 1270
and H.R. 1295 before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 124 (1996) [hereinafter Hearing] (quoting statement
of Thomas E. Smith, Chair of American Bar Association's Section of Intellectual
Property Law, providing example that if courts allowed Rolls-Royce candy or Rolls-
Royce pants, in time, Rolls-Royce mark would have no meaning).
2000] 283
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result, state legislatures began to recognize dilution claims and en-
act anti-dilution statutes.42
In early 1996, after serious efforts by a variety of parties to in-
fluence Congress to adopt such a rule, Congress enacted a bill to
amend the Lanham Act, entitled the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act of 1995. 43 Because the Act does not provide a clear outline of
42. See Bible, supra note 1, at 298. Schechter tried to create a federal trade-
mark act to codify his "whittling away" dilution theory but Congress passed the
Lanham Act instead, which did not protect trademarks from dilution. See id. at
298. Schechter's theory, however, was influential in common law and states began
enacting their own anti-dilution statutes. See id. at 300. In March 1995, United
States Representative from California Carlos Moorhead introduced a bill to amend
the Lanham Act to include dilution protection. See id. The House of Representa-
tives passed the bill in December 1995, and it was approved by the Senate without
debate and signed into law by President Clinton in early 1996. See id. at 297-303.
43. SeeBible, supranote 1, at 297; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (Supp. II
1996). The Act reads, in pertinent part:
(c) Remedies for dilution of famous marks.
(1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the princi-
ples of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an
injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce of a
mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become fa-
mous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to
obtain such other relief as is provided in this subsection. In determining
whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider factors
such as, but not limited to -
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (B)
the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the
goods or services with which the mark is used; (C) the duration and
extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; (D) the geographical
extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; (E) the channels
of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used; (F) the
degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of
trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the in-
junction is sought; (G) the nature and extent of use of the same or
similar marks by third parties; and (H) whether the mark was regis-
tered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905,
or on the principal register.
(2) In an action brought under this subsection, the owner of the famous
mark shall be entitled only to injunctive relief unless the person against
whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to trade on the owner's
reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark. If such willful intent
is proven, the owner of the famous mark shall also be entitled to the
remedies set forth in sections 1117(a) and 1118 of this title, subject to the
discretion of the court and principles of equity ....
(4) The following shall not be actionable under this section:
(A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative com-
mercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or
services of the owner of the famous mark.
(B) Noncommercial use of a mark.
(C) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. 11 1996).
Further, the definition of "dilution" is:
[t]he lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distin-
guish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of
[Vol. 7: p. 279
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what constitutes trademark dilution or how to prove it, courts have
interpreted the Act in light of state anti-dilution case law and legis-
lative intent. 44
Congress passed the Act to "protect 'famous' trademarks
against uses that were non-competing but that nevertheless blurred
or diluted the distinctiveness of the famous trademarks." 45 The Act
defines dilution as the "lessening of the capacity of a famous mark
to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the pres-
ence or absence of (1) competition between the owner of the fa-
mous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion,
mistake or deception." 46 In order to have a dilution claim under
the Act, a plaintiff must show that: (1) its mark is famous; (2) defen-
dant is making a commercial use of the mark in commerce; and (3)
defendant's use began after the mark became famous. 47
Congress passed the Act for three reasons: first, to "protect fa-
mous marks from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of
the mark or tarnish or disparage it;"48 second, to provide judicial
uniformity in dilution protection across the nation;49 third, to
(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or
(2) likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception.
Id. § 1127.
44. See Bible, supra note 1, at 304. But see Kenneth L. Port, The "Unnatural"
Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary ?, 18 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 433, 449 (1994) (stating that state dilution statutes are overbroad and
have had "virtually no impact on the outcome of trademark cases").
45. Nike Inc. v. Nike Sec., L.P., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1202, 1204 (N.D. Ill. 1999)
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
47. See Ringling II, 170 F.3d at 452; see also Sony Computer Entm't, Inc., v.
Connectix Corp., 48 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1222 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (applying 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c) (1)).
48. Sony, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 1222 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 2 (1995));
see also Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Akkaoui, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1836, 1838 (N.D. Cal. 1996);
Serad, supra note 41, at 221. In addition to blurring and tarnishment, the Second
Circuit in Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 45 (2d Cir. 1994) found
"alteration of a distinctive mark" to be a third aspect of trademark dilution under
New York law. See id. at 44. Alteration can occur when a senior mark's selling
power is "made fun of" and thereby diluted. See id.; see also Staffin, supra note 35, at
139-49 (recognizing a fourth aspect of trademark dilution under California law -
dilution by genericization). A defendant's use of plaintiff's mark dilutes by gener-
icization when it "creates a serious threat to the uniqueness and distinctiveness'
[sic] of the trademark, and if continued would create a risk of making.. . generic
... the words of which the trademark is composed." Id. at 142 (quoting Sikes Lab.,
Inc. v. Kalvin, 610 F. Supp. 849, 858 (C.D. Cal. 1985)). For example, in Murphy
Door Bed Co., Inc. v. Interior Sleep Systems, Inc., the Second Circuit found that
"murphy bed" had become a generic name for a fold-out closet bed. 874 F.2d 95,
97 (2d Cir. 1989).
49. See Bible, supra note 1, at 300. Bible states that, arguably, the reason for
the Act was to promote judicial uniformity. The author noted, however, that the
fact that Congress passed F-TDA to supplement, not to preempt state statutes,
2000]
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"'harmonize and nationalize' the often conflicting and sometimes
non-existent state laws in effect at the time."50
Even after the Act was passed, however, dilution case law has
continued to be "nebulous."51 Some courts, contrary to the lan-
guage of the Act, still require a "likelihood of confusion" to prove
dilution. 52 Other courts, because of the vagueness of the statutory
definition of dilution, have either skipped steps of the proof pro-
cess or have completely refused to apply the Act to non-competitive
actions.53 Furthermore, inconsistent decisions have occurred be-
cause the Act did not incorporate the "likelihood of dilution" lan-
guage previously used by most state anti-dilution statutes.5 4 Results
seems contrary to the stated purpose. See id. (citing Hearing, supra note 41, at 121-
23); see also Miles J. Alexander & Michael K. Heilbronner, Dilution Under Section
43(c) of the Lanham Act, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 99 (1996) (stating that state
dilution standards have been interpreted unevenly).
50. Nike, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1206 (quoting Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. OfficeMax,
Inc., 949 F. Supp. 409, 418 (1996)); see also David S. Welkowitz, Oh Deere, What's to
Become of Dilution?, 4 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 1, 20 (1996) (explaining that placing
dilution under federal protection affords plaintiffs ability to obtain nationwide re-
lief - previously a problem when only relief was under state laws). But see Port,
supra note 44, at 454. The author argues that trademarks are not subject to dilu-
tion, are vague and unarticulated and therefore, inconsistencies in state applica-
tions of dilution rights should be expected. See id. Port adds that the belief that
courts will amend their views of dilution because of the enactment of a federal
statute "seems very naive." Port, supra note 44, at 455.
51. See Lori Krafte-Jacobs, Judicial Interpretation of the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act of 1995, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 659, 694-95 (1998) (discussing different courts'
approaches to analyzing dilution cases and predicting that cases will not become
more consistent because Act's definition of dilution is vague).
52. See id. at 696; see also I.P. Lund Trading ApS., Kroin Inc. v. Kohler Co., 163
F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 1998). The court illustrates the difference between "consumer
confusion" and "dilution": "No one would confuse Kodak pianos with Kodak film,
but the use of the name on the piano could dilute the effectiveness as a mark for
the film." LP. Lund, 163 F.3d at 49.
53. See Krafte-Jacobs, supra note 51, at 693. The author points out discrepan-
cies between the Act and courts' findings in light of the Act. See id.; see, e.g., Sun-
beam Prods. Inc. v. West Bend Co., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545 (S.D. Miss. 1996)
(discussing whether mark was famous but not whether dilution had occurred);
Levi Strauss & Co. v. San Francisco 415 Co., No. C-96 03219 VRW, 1996 WL 724786
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 1996) (finding dilution without any determination that
defendant's use lessened mark's capacity to identify and distinguish its source);
Gazette Newspapers, Inc. v. New Paper, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 688 (D. Md. 1996) (us-
ing only fame factor test, the first prong of two prong test, to determine whether
dilution had occurred).
54. See Krafte-Jacobs, supra note 51, at 694. The author refers to the "Sweet
factor test," a list of factors to find dilution based on Judge Sweet's concurring
opinion in Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026
(2d Cir. 1989). See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet, Inc., 855 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1988) (using "Sweet factor
test"); Clinique Labs., Inc. v. Dep Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(using "Sweet factor test" to hold that Clinique had demonstrated a "likelihood of
dilution"); WAWA, Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (balancing
[Vol. 7: p. 279
8
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol7/iss2/4
THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT
in dilution cases will continue to be unpredictable until the lan-
guage of the Act is amended or defined.55
These interpretation inconsistencies have occurred despite the
Supreme Court's principle on statutory interpretation. The dissent
in Landgraf v. USI Film Product?6 states the principle that the "start-
ing point for interpretation of a statute 'is the language of the stat-
ute itself.' 5 7 It qualifies the plain meaning rule by adding that "a
statute must, if possible, be construed in such a fashion that every
word has operative effect."58 In addition, the rule dictates that "if
the statutory language is plain and admits of no more than one
meaning, the duty of the interpretation does not arise, and.., the
sole function of the courts is to enforce [the statute] according to
its terms. ''59 Nevertheless, courts have differed in their interpreta-
tions of the Act by ignoring plain meaning interpretation. 60
Regardless of how each court interprets and applies the Act, all
courts recognize two forms of dilution: tarnishment and blurring. 61
Tarnishment occurs when a defendant's mark (junior mark") de-
grades the positive impressions of the original user's mark ("senior
mark") in the minds of consumers.62 Usually the junior mark cre-
"Sweet factor" to find that WAWA's mark had been diluted by Haaf's HAHA
mark); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 798 (S.D. Tex. 1996)
(finding that "Sweet factors" balanced out in defendant's favor and holding
Capece's mark did not dilute Elvis Presley Enterprises' marks); see also Edward E.
Vassallo & Maryanne Dickey, Protection in the United States for "Famous Marks". The
Federal Trademark Dilution Act Revisited, 9 FoRmHA IrrELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
503, 520 (1999) (recognizing that some courts mistakenly base their decisions on
"likelihood of dilution" standard and that this confusion makes proper standard
determining dilution more difficult).
55. See Krafte-Jacobs, supra note 51, at 694 (stating that "[b ] ecause the FTDA's
definition of dilution is not especially helpful in establishing guidelines for deter-
mining whether dilution exists, standards will likely be no more consistent than
before the FTDA took effect").
56. 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 294 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). The Court cites Kaiser Aluminum &
Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990) (quoting Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
58. Id. at 295 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Nordic Vill.,
Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992) (citing United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39
(1955))).
59. Shafer v. Preston Mem'l Hosp. Corp., 107 F.3d 274, 277 (4th Cir. 1997)
(quoting United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 145 (4th Cir. 1994)) (noting that
court should interpret term according to its ordinary or natural meaning when
Congress does not expressly define statutory term).
60. See Ringling II, 170 F.3d at 455 (recognizing that courts grappling with
dilution issues have not yielded consistent decisions).
61. For a discussion of dilution, see infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
62. See id.; see also Sony Computer Entm't Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 48 F. Supp.
2d 1212, 1223 (N.D. Cal. 1999). The court held that Sony established likelihood
that Connectix' VGS diluted its PlayStation trademark because some PlayStation
2000]
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ates negative impressions of the senior mark by associating it with
poor quality or with negative images.63 Blurring, however, is more
subtle and less direct.64 Blurring occurs when ajunior mark injures
a senior mark's selling power by lessening the senior mark's ability
to serve as a "unique identifier" of an owner's products or ser-
vices. 65 By creating a mental association with the senior mark in the
minds of consumers, the senior mark's use as an identifier of the
original goods or services is undermined. 66
Courts have used different standards to prove dilution, requir-
ing either a showing of "likelihood of dilution" or, alternatively, "ac-
tual dilution."6 7 The two standards differ not only in the amount of
time a plaintiff has to bring a claim of dilution but also in the level
of accuracy necessary to prove the dilution claim. 68 In general,
courts following the "likelihood of dilution" standard are those ei-
ther interpreting state anti-dilution statutes or interpreting the Act
according to those state statutes. 69 Courts using the "actual dilu-
games do not function as well on VGS as they do on PlayStation console and con-
sumers were confused about the source of their unsatisfactory playing experience.
See id. The court also noted that the Ninth Circuit held that "tarnishment occurs
when a famous mark is linked to products of poor quality or is portrayed in an
unwholesome manner," citing Panavision Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296,
1304 (C.D. Cal. 1996) affjd, 141 F.3d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir. 1998). See Sony, 48 F.
Supp. 2d at 1212, 1223; see also Polo Ralph Lauren L.P. v. Schuman, 46
U.S.P.Q.D.2d 1046 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
63. See Sony, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 1223.
64. See Bible, supra note 1, at 304 (describing tarnishment as occurring in
"much more direct and injurious manner" than blurring).
65. See Nabisco Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 188, 207 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (holding that sale of "CatDog" cheese crackers, which included goldfish-
shaped crackers was likely to dilute famous mark "Goldfish" crackers).
66. See Fruit of the Loom, Inc. v. Girouard, 994 F.2d 1359, 1361 (9th Cir.
1993) (finding that no mental association exists in reasonable buyer's mind be-
tween "Fruit of the Loom" mark, used by Fruit of the Loom ("FOL"), and "Fruit
Cups and Fruit Flops" mark, used by Two Left Feet ("TLF")); see also WAWA, Inc. v.
Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that plaintiff established that its
mark ("WAWA") will be diluted through blurring or parody by defendant's use of
similar mark ("HAHA")).
67. See Bible, supra note 1, at 307.
68. See id. at 307-08. The author explains that under the actual dilution stan-
dard, the junior mark must have been on the market before the plaintiff brings the
dilution claim. See id. Also, the actual dilution standard generally tends to pro-
duce more accurate and substantial evidence. See id.
69. See Nabisco, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 210 (stating that showing likelihood of dilu-
tion will automatically establish irreparable harm and holding that, "[o]ver time,
the presence of Nabisco's goldfish-shaped cracker within the CatDog mix is likely
to weaken the focus of consumers on true source of the Goldfish."); see also WAWA,
40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1629 (following "Sweet factor test" to find likelihood of dilution);
Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1035-40
(2d Cir. 1989) (using six "Sweet factors" in considering likelihood of dilution by
blurring under New York anti-dilution statute); Munters Corp. v. Matsui Am., Inc.,
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tion" standard, however, remain consistent with the plain meaning
rule. 70
There are a number of different methods courts use to find
dilution under the "likelihood of dilution" standard.71 In Mead
Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.,72 Second Circuit
Judge Sweet wrote a concurring opinion setting out certain factors
to determine "blurring" and "likelihood of dilution. '73 Some
courts have focused on specific language in their respective state
anti-dilution statutes to determine whether the "likelihood" stan-
dard applies.74 The Eleventh Circuit has enforced a different stan-
dard of proof depending on whether a mark is strong or weak,
while the Seventh Circuit has held that a plaintiff need only show
dilution of the "distinctiveness of the marks." 75
730 F. Supp. 790, 802 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that under Illinois' "likelihood of
dilution" standard, Matsui's use of word "honeycomb" is not likely to dilute
Munter's "Honeycombe" mark).
70. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp.
2d 1070 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (following standard set out in Ringling to hold that Play-
boy failed to provide evidence of actual dilution by defendant); see also Am. Cyana-
mid Co. v. Neutraceutical Corp., 54 F. Supp. 2d 379, 393 (D.N.J. 1999) (granting
defendant's motion for summary judgment because plaintiff failed to prove actual
harm to plaintiffs product's selling power by showing defendant's mark actually
made consumers unable to identify and distinguish products with appropriate
goods and services); I.P. Lund Trading ApS., Kroin, Inc. v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27,
46 (1st Cir. 1998) (using "higher standard" to determine whether mark qualifies as
"famous" under Act, court did not employ "likelihood" language and stated that
no relief is given unless "the mark has been diluted").
71. See Bible, supra note 1, at 300 (discussing proponents' arguments to gain
support for Federal Dilution Act and pointing out "patchwork system" of state
statutes).
72. 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989).
73. See Mead, 875 F.2d at 1032-40 (holding that LEXUS was not likely to cause
blurring between LEXIS and LEXUS marks even in market where LEXIS is used
because, for general public, LEXIS has no distinctive quality to be diluted); see also
Richard L. Kirkpatrick, Trademark Infringement and Dilution Update, in UNDERSTAND-
ING BAsIc TRADEMARK LAW 1999, at 61, 66 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, &
Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. 569, 1999) (listing "Sweet factors": (a)
similarity of the marks; (b) similarity of the products; (c) sophistication of consum-
ers; (d) predatory intent; (e) renown of senior mark; and (f) renown of junior
mark).
74. See Munters Corp. v. Matsui Am., Inc., 730 F. Supp. 790, 801 (N.D. Ill.
1989) (determining that "likelihood" standard stems from statutory language "will
dilute").
75. See Freedom Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176, 1186 (11th Cir.
1985). The court explained that if senior mark is distinctive, plaintiff need only
prove that defendant has made significant use of very similar mark. See id. If mark
is weak, and lacks distinctiveness, plaintiff must prove that defendant's use of mark
decreased senior mark's value in its relevant market. See id.; see also Ringling Bros.-
Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet, Inc., 855
F.2d 480, 482 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that "an injunction must be granted if the
prior user can show that the subsequent user's use dilutes that distinctiveness").
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Those courts that follow the "actual dilution" standard base
their interpretations on a more narrow reading of the Act, which
follows the plain meaning rule of statutory interpretation. 76 Ac-
cording to this standard, a plaintiff must prove "actual harm" to the
senior mark by showing that a junior mark lessened the senior
mark's selling power. 77 Surveys have been plaintiffs' primary tools
to prove "actual harm" to courts using the "actual dilution"
standard. 78
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Ringling II, the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of
whether Utah's use of the trademark "Greatest Snow" constituted
dilution by blurring Ringling's "Greatest Show" trademark. 79 To
decipher whether Utah's mark diluted Ringling's mark, the court
discussed the three elements a plaintiff must prove to establish dilu-
tion under the Act:
(1) a sufficient similarity between the junior and senior
marks to evoke an instinctive mental association of the two
by a relevant universe of consumers which (2) has caused
(3) actual economic harm to the famous mark's economic
76. See Bible, supra note 1, at 310 (noting that Act provides relief only when
junior mark causes dilution of original mark and commenting that use of "causes"
suggests that plaintiff must show actual dilution); see also WAWA, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d at
1629 (relying on survey results as evidence of "actual harm"); Ringling II, 170 F.3d
at 452-53 (using survey evidence as proof that no "actual harm" occurred). But see
Virginia R. Richard, U.S. Trademark Law 1999 Developments, in PLI's FIFrH ANNUAL
INST. FOR INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW, at 595, 635 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trade-
marks, & Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. 573, 1999) (doubting effi-
cacy of surveys as method of proving actual dilution); Simone A. Rose, Will Atlas
Shrug? Dilution Protection for "Famous" Trademarks: Anti-Competitive "Monopoly" or
Earned "Property"Right?, 47 FLA. L. REv. 653, 692-94 (1995). The author describes a
form of actual dilution in terms of "consumer search cost" - the time a consumer
spends searching through numerous brands of a product to find quality and con-
sistency of products associated with distinctive trademarks. See id. When a defen-
dant uses a mark substantially similar to or the same as plaintiffs mark, the
consumer search costs increase and as a result plaintiff must spend more on adver-
tising and decrease the price of its marked product. See id. In these situations,
dilution causes actual harm. See id.
77. See Bible, supra note 1, at 310 (noting that " [i]n contrast to standard pre-
scribed in Judge Sweet's decision, a standard requiring proof of actual dilution
through direct evidence tends to be more accurate and dispositive"). For a list of
the "Sweet factors," see supra note 73.
78. See Bible, supra note 1, at 313 (explaining that in trademark dilution cases,
survey clearly demonstrating actual dilution is probably "the plaintiffs strongest
and most persuasive evidence").
79. See Ringling II, 170 F.3d at 451.
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value by lessening its former selling power as an advertis-
ing agent for its goods and services.80
The court based its analysis of Ringling's dilution claim on the lan-
guage of the Act, the legislative purpose behind passing the Act,
and the plain meaning rule of statutory interpretation. 81 The
court's final decision rested on its interpretation of "actual eco-
nomic harm." 82
1. Statutory Language of the Act
According to the court, the controversy surrounding statutory
interpretation turns on how courts interpret "capacity" in the Act's
definition of dilution as the "lessening of the capacity of a famous
mark to identify and distinguish goods or services."8 3 By refuting
the argument that "capacity" indicates the power of the mark to
dilute another mark in the future, the court rejected the "likeli-
hood of dilution" standard.84 The Ringling II court defined "capac-
ity" according to the words surrounding it in the Act.85 The verb
immediately preceding "capacity" is "lessening," not "will lessen" or
"may lessen." Additionally, elsewhere in the statute, the conduct
being prohibited is described as "another person's... use."86 The
court indicated that the lack of such limiting phrases as "threatened
use" shows the legislature's intent to keep the "likelihood" standard
out of the statute.8 7
The court also briefly contrasted the damages awarded in state
anti-dilution statutes with those awarded in the Act.8 8 While state
statutes provide only injunctive relief, apparently anticipating "like-
lihood of dilution" and future harm, the Act provides compensa-
tory and restitutionary relief for consummated economic harm if
willful conduct on the part of the defendant is demonstrated.8 9 Al-
80. Id. at 453 (stating standard of proof for dilution claims under Lanham
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 43(c)(1), 45; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)(1), 1127).
81. See id.
82. See id. at 459-65.
83. Id. at 460-61 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127).
84. See Ringling II, 170 F.3d at 461.
85. See id. at 460-61 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1)).
86. Id.
87. See id. The court here found that interpretation of statute as meaning
"future capacity" or "likelihood" of lessening capacity went against "ordinary intrin-
sic meaning" and did not make sense in light of the words' context. See id.
88. See id. at 460-61.
89. See Ringling II, 170 F.3d at 461 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125 (c)(2), 1117(a),
1118).
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lowing for these remedies shows the focus moving away from the
"likelihood" standard.90
Finally, the court underscored the fact that the Act does not
include the phrase "likelihood of dilution," that is ubiquitous in
state anti-dilution statutes.9 1 This, the court reasoned, is the "most
telling" textual indication of the legislature's intent not to use the
"likelihood" standard.92
2. Legislative Purpose
After reviewing the relevant statutory provisions of the Act, the
court reasoned that the narrow interpretation of dilution as encom-
passing "actual harm" is in accord with the legislative intent.93 Be-
cause the Act's legislative record is limited, the court looked to the
evolution of dilution theory preceding the Act to determine its
meaning.9 4
The court indicated that since the beginnings of anti-dilution
law, courts were inconsistent in their interpretations of "likelihood
of confusion."95 Furthermore, when states began enacting anti-di-
lution statutes, courts were not eager to apply them to trademark
cases.96 When courts did apply the statutes, they would often deny
claims on the grounds that the plaintiffs did not prove "likelihood
of confusion," despite the clear statutory language rejecting this as
90. See id.
91. See id. (supplementing observation with recognition that commentators
have noticed this difference between Act and previous state anti-dilution statutes
and asserting that while commentators have noticed difference, most do not give
helpful textual analyses and ultimately are "hopelessly divided" in their interpreta-
tions of issue).
92. See id. at 461 (stating that "[flinally and most telling, there is the fact that
in the face of the obvious centrality of 'likelihood of dilution' provisions in the
interpretation and application of state anti-dilution statutes for the fifty years of
their existence, the federal Act does not so provide").
93. See id. at 458-59. The court admitted that interpretation of dilution in-
cluding only consummated harm is more narrow than state anti-dilution statutes
but also stated that key textual differences between state and federal acts dictates
this interpretation as "exactly what was intended by Congress." Id. (citing I.P.
Lund Trading ApS., Kroin Inc. v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 45 (1st Cir. 1998)). The
court explained that "dilution is a term of art given specific, rigorous meaning by
the Act." Id. at 459.
94. See Ringling II, 170 F.3d at 452. The court examined the Act's legislative
record and the vast background of trademark dilution theory after admitting that
its interpretation of the Act did not "leap fully and immediately from the statutory
text." Id. at 453.
95. See id. at 456 (stating that "this bare-boned codification, centered on an
unelaborated term of art having no previously acquired meaning through the com-
mon law decisional process, has puzzled courts from the outset as to just exactly
what legal interest it sought to protect, and legal harm to prevent").
96. See id. at 455 (citing summary in RESTATEMENT ON UNFAIR COMPETITION).
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a cause of action.97 Eventually, courts followed state statutory lan-
guage and found dilution based on a "likelihood of dilution" stan-
dard; yet this standard allowed for differing proof methods and,
consequently, resulted in unpredictable outcomes.98 In light of the
varied state anti-dilution case law, the court recognized Congress'
creation of a federal dilution statute omitting the "likelihood" lan-
guage, as intending to narrow the scope of anti-dilution actions and
to provide protection solely for actual dilution. 99
3. Plain Meaning Rule & Actual Dilution Standard
The court in Ringling asserted that the plain meaning rule of
statutory interpretation supports the "actual dilution" standard.100
The statute on its face requires "actual dilution."101 According to
the Supreme Court, the plain meaning rule dictates that "[i]f the
words convey a definite meaning, which involves no absurdity, nor
any contradiction of other parts of the instrument, then that mean-
ing, apparent on the face of the instrument, must be ac-
97. See id. at 457 (explaining that courts required plaintiffs prove dilution by
showing some sort of customer confusion regarding products) (citing Cue Publ'g
Co. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 256 N.Y.S.2d 239, 245-46 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965))).
98. See id. Before the Act, many courts deciding dilution issues followed the
"Sweet factor" test, devised by Judge Sweet in Mead, requiring that likelihood of
harm to selling power be proven and recognizing that harm could occur without
presence of consumer confusion. See id. (citing Mead, 875 F.2d at 1035). For an
explanation of the "Sweet factors," see supra note 73 and accompanying text.
Some courts approached the dilution issue by assuming that dilution could be
proven by simply showing similarities between junior and senior marks. See Mead,
875 F.2d at 1035. Courts using this standard consider likelihood of harm to mark's
selling power impossible to prove and therefore hold likelihood should simply be
assumed from two similar marks. See Ringling I, 170 F.3d at 457 (citing Ringling
Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet, Inc., 855
F.2d 480, 484 (7th Cir. 1988); Freedom Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176,
1186 (11th Cir. 1985); Gaeta Cromwell, Inc. v. Banyan Lakes Vill., 523 So.2d 624,
626-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).
99. See Ringling II, 170 F.3d at 454 (noting that state anti-dilution case law
provided background for enactment of the Act in 1995); see also id. at 458-59. The
court admitted its interpretation of the Act is stringent, but supported interpreta-
tion by citing I.P. Lund Trading ApS., Kroin Inc. v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 45 (1stCir. i998) (statiing that dLlution is givcn "rigorous meaning by the Art") n set
-* .--- 1 -1 --- e --- -c" and assert-
ing strict interpretation is Congress' intent. See Ringling H1, 170 F.3d at 459.
100. See Ringling I, 170 F.3d at 461 n.6 (following plain meaning interpreta-
tion of Act set out and rejected in Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whit-
tling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. Prr. L. REV. 789, 840
(1997), and asserting that according to plain meaning rule, this interpretation can-
not be rejected). For a definition of the plain meaning rule, see supra notes 57-60
and accompanying text.
101. See Ringling I, 170 F.3d at 460-61. The court asserted that its interpreta-
tion of the Act is in accord with ordinary intrinsic meaning of statutory language
and presumed the Act includes "likelihood standard" when statute does not con-
tain language indicating such, cannot be accepted as Act's plain meaning. See id.
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cepted ... ,"102 The court found that the words of the Act convey a
definite meaning and involve no absurdity. Therefore, according
to Supreme Court precedent, the "actual dilution" standard must
be accepted. 10 3
4. Proving Actual Dilution
One issue with which the court struggled in RinglingIIwas how
to prove that the junior mark actually harmed the senior mark's
selling power. 10 4 Since the Act excludes the consumer confusion
test as a tool to trace harm to the senior mark back to the junior
mark, courts have agreed that a plaintiff must prove this causal con-
nection by some mental association between the two marks.10 5
Courts in the past have adopted two distinct approaches to proving
that a mental association exists: (1) the Mead factor analysis; and
(2) the "property rights in gross" model. 10 6 Both methods were de-
vised in order to find a "likelihood of dilution."10 7
The court rejected the Mead factor test, deeming it inappropri-
ate for assessing a claim under the Act. 108 The Mead factor test per-
mits both the cause and the harm to be adduced from the similarity
of the marks alone.109 The court discarded the balancing test as a
"chancy process at best.""10
102. Id. at 461 n.6 (citing Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670 (1889)).
103. See id. (noting Klieger's opposing opinion that while actual harm stan-
dard represents plain meaning of statute, this meaning cannot be accepted be-
cause it would be absurd to require an interpretation that would create "an
impenetrable barrier to any federal dilution action" and dismissing it with argu-
ment that actual dilution standard must be proven by ordinary processes).
104. See id. at 457 (identifying "selling power" as representing economic
power of mark then noting that issue of proving harm to senior mark's selling
power is and has been "real interpretive problem").
105. See id. at 457-58 (noting that in absence of consumer confusion, mental
association must be shown to be cause of harm).
106. See Ringling II, 170 F.3d at 458-59 (noting that courts have used these
methods to determine "likelihood of dilution" rather than "actual dilution"). For
an explanation of the Mead factor analysis ("Sweet factor" test), see supra note 73
and accompanying text.
107. See Ringling II, 170 F.3d at 458.
108. See id. at 464 (citing I.P Lund, 163 F.3d at 49-50); see also Klieger, supra
note 100, at 826-27 (explaining test factors and problems associated with applying
Mead factor test).
109. See Ringling II, 170 F.3d at 459 (stating that Act requires only proof of
sufficient visual similarity of marks to evoke in consumers "instinctive mental asso-
ciation" of marks).
110. Id. at 464 (noting "obvious utility in making the long leaps of inference
that can be used to find mere 'likelihood of dilution'" and highlighting problems
caused by inferring actual harm and effective causation in this manner).
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The court also rejected Ringling's contention that the "prop-
erty in-gross" method is the correct means to prove harm.1"'
Ringling asserted that to prove dilution under the Act, a sufficient
visual similarity between the marks evoking "instinctive mental asso-
ciation" for consumers, is evidence of "actual harm."' 12 In other
words, mental association alone is sufficient to prove harm under
the Act.'1 3 This "property rights" model stems from Schechter's
definition of dilution as perfect replication of a senior mark by a
junior mark, harming the senior mark by lessening its "unique-
ness."" 4 The court concluded that Ringling's mental-association-
as-proof-of-dilution proposal, in conjunction with the theory that in
cases of identical marks the mental-association is presumed, creates
property rights in-gross by means of injunction. 115
In contrast, the Act specifically requires the commercial use of
the junior mark to create a mental association between the junior
mark and the senior mark. It further requires that this mental asso-
ciation causes "actual harm" to the senior mark's selling power by a
lessening of its ability to identify and distinguish goods.11 6 In light
of these requirements, the court held that the Act "will not bear a
property right in-gross interpretation."' 17
Ringling argued that the purpose of the Act is to find "likeli-
hood of dilution" since likelihood is much easier to prove than ac-
tual economic harm.118 While the court acknowledged that "actual
111. See id. at 459 (rejecting "property rights" argument as conflicting with
Congressional intent by ignoring Act's prescribed elements of specific harm and
causal nexus).
112. See id. (stating Ringling's proposed method of proof). For a discussion
of the standard of proof under the Act, see supra text accompanying note 77.
113. See Ringling II, 170 F.3d at 459 (stating mental-association-alone interpre-
tation is in opposition with rigorous dilution standard intended by Congress).
114. See id. at 456 (citing Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark
Protection, 40 HARv. L. REv. 813, 829-30 (1927)). Schechter assumed that any repli-
cation would lessen senior mark's uniqueness and no proof of economic harm
would be required beyond replication of senior mark by junior mark. See Bible,
supra note 1, at 297 (citing Frank I. Schecter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protec-
tion, 40 HARV. L. REv. 813, 829 (1927)).
115. 5&-cR g- TT 1 '10 1 " at 459 (2v-rtinor that had statutory incorporation
of property rights in-gross model been legislative intention, it is one that could
have easily been expressed by proscribing use of any substantially similar junior
mark).
116. See id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)(1), 1127).
117. Id. (stating that Ringling's argument not only contradicted relevant stat-
utory language but also only addressed cases involving identical marks which are
not at issue here).
118. See id. at 463 (addressing Ringling's argument that even though Act does
not include "likelihood" language, this language should be presumed because
proof under this method is easier, and as court pointed out, may even be
presumed).
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dilution" may be harder to prove, it indicated that there are feasible
methods to prove the causal nexus between the mental associations
and the economic harm to the senior mark. 119 Alternate methods
make the proof process practicable. 120
Ringling also argued that its consumer survey evidence sup-
ports a finding of dilution under the Act.121 Though the court gen-
erally accepted consumer survey evidence as appropriate proof
under the Act, it found that Ringling's survey shows no evidence of
a lessening of Ringling's selling power resulting from consumers'
mental associations. 122 For a consumer survey to show actual harm
under the Act, the mental associations must "go beyond mere asso-
ciation of the marks in isolation and involve some mistake or confu-
sion as to the marks and their respective goods or services."1 23
Because Ringling's survey merely proved that consumers associated
"Greatest Show" and "Greatest Snow" with their respective services,
Ringling did not prove the required mental association between the
marks and consequently could not prove that a mental association
between the two caused actual economic harm to the "Greatest
Show" mark. Accordingly, the court held that Ringling did not
prove the required "actual dilution" under the Act. 12 4
V. CRITIcAL ANALYSIS
While the Ringling court decision is internally consistent, the
court's interpretation of the Act to protect only against "actual dilu-
tion" is not consistent with prior dilution case law.' 25 This narrower
119. See id. at 461 n.6 (stating that "the Act is susceptible to proof by ordinary
processes, though with obvious difficulties given the substantive uncertainties of
harm and causation elements of the claim"). The court proposed three general
means to prove actual dilution: (1) proof of actual loss of revenues; (2) consumer
survey designed to show both "mental association" between marks as well as further
consumer impressions from which connection between cause and harm could be
inferred; (3) relevant factors such as extent ofjunior mark's exposure, similarity of
marks, firmness of senior mark's hold as indirect evidence to complement other
proof. See id. at 465.
120. See Pingling II, 170 F.3d at 465.
121. See id. at 463.
122. See id. (concluding that evidence provided did not even show mental
association between marks much less proof that mental association caused actual
harm to Ringling's selling power).
123. Id.. Over Ringling's objections, the court reasoned that the lower court's
interpretation of consumer survey results was in accordance with the Act. See id.
124. See id. (affirming district court's decision that Ringling's survey evidence
did not prove actual dilution under clearly erroneous standard).
125. For an explanation of courts' interpretation of the Act as requiring "like-
lihood of dilution" under the Act as opposed to "actual dilution" interpretation,
see supra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
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interpretation, however, is justifiable in light of the legislative intent
in creating the Act.
The court's decision in Ringling, interpreting the Act as requir-
ing proof of "actual dilution," is not consistent with prior courts'
decisions following a "likelihood of dilution" standard. 126 Prior to
1996, courts had to rely on cases using state anti-dilution statutes as
precedent because no case law existed interpreting the Act. 127 The
Act is different from the state statutes, however, because it incorpo-
rates the "actual dilution" rather than the "likelihood of dilution"
language. 128 By imputing state law standards into the Act, courts
risk misinterpretation similar to earlier courts' enforcement of
"likelihood of confusion" standards under state anti-dilution
statutes. 129
Although the Ringling court's "actual dilution" interpretation
of the Act breaks away from prior decisions' reliance on the "likeli-
hood" standard, its interpretation of the Act is consistent with the
rules of statutory interpretation. As a general rule, the "starting
point for interpretation of a statute 'is the language of the statute
itself."" 130 The statute on its face requires "actual dilution," not
"likelihood of dilution. ' 131 Justice Blackmun argued similarly that
that there is "no reason to dismiss as 'unlikely,' the most natural
reading of the statute, in order to embrace some other reading that
is also 'possible.' "' 132 In Ringling, the court followed this rule by
interpreting the Act according to its plain meaning rather than
reading it to include a "likelihood of dilution" standard, which, ac-
cording to past case law, is also plausible.
The court rejected the argument that interpreting the Act to
cover only "actual dilution" imposes an impossible burden of proof
126. See id.
127. See Krafte-Jacobs, supra note 51, at 693 (observing that because substan-
tial case law interpreting Act was naturally unavailable to courts in 1996, it was
logical for courts to rely on state dilution case law).
128. See Bible, supra note 1, at 308 (stating that two standards differ largely
regarding when plaintiff can bring claim and what plaintiff must prove).
129. See Krafte-Jacobs, supra note 51, at 694 (warning that courts relying on
state statutes to aide in interpretation of Act may import some of same "misunder-
standings that have plagued state and federal courts' treatment of state law dilu-
tion cases").
130. For a discussion of the effect of the Act, see Krafte-Jacobs, supra note 51
and accompanying text.
131. For an explanation of the court's statement that its interpretation of the
Act is in accord with ordinary intrinsic meaning of statutory language, see supra
notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
132. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 296 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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on the plaintiff, making the standard "absurd" and, therefore, con-
trary to the plain meaning rule. 133 The court admitted that the bur-
den of proof is more difficult than that for "likelihood of dilution,"
but contended that there are reasonable means of proving "actual
dilution," supporting its contention with various means to prove di-
lution.134 One of these methods, the survey, has been used fre-
quently in litigation, in early trademark cases finding consumer
confusion, and successfully in past dilution cases. 135 Because there
are possible means to prove "actual dilution," the court's reading is
not absurd and, therefore, follows the plain meaning rule.136
By enforcing the "actual dilution" interpretation of the Act, the
court set out a standard of proof that is "more accurate and disposi-
tive" than the "likelihood standard."137 The legislative intent of the
Act was to implement a nationwide, uniform dilution statute to
mend the problems of the patchwork system of state statutes. 138
The problem with the state statutory "likelihood" method of proof
is that it is easier to prove than "actual dilution," resulting in a "scat-
tered and often inconsistent approach to dilution protection."'13 9
The court's narrow interpretation of the Act is consistent with the
133. See Ringling I, 170 F.3d at 464 (stating that proof of actual dilution can-
not be considered impossible and therefore, not possibly what Congress could
have intended).
134. See id. For a list and explanation of proof methods, see supra note 119
and accompanying text; see also Bible, supra note 1, at 314 (endorsing use of surveys
as viable means to prove "actual dilution" under Act, noting that surveys often have
been used in trademark cases to show likelihood of confusion and explaining
methodologies to help litigants compile reliable surveys).
135. See Bible, supra note 1, at 314-17 (noting that surveys are used frequently
in litigation, and there are guidelines provided in the Manual for Complex Litiga-
tion); see also WAWA, Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629, 1632 (1996) (finding plain-
tiff's evidence of marketing survey concluding that twenty-nine percent of people
in HAHA's neighborhood who were interviewed about defendant's market associ-
ated HAHA markets with WAWA markets was credible); Staffin, supra note 35, at
161 (speculating that surveys will be used more frequently as evidence of dilution
and that "criticism that the dilution doctrine is too ephemeral, does not address a
real injury, and is incapable of empirical proof is not valid"). But see Vassallo &
Dickey, supra note 54, at 520.
136. For a discussion of "actual harm" standard, see supra note 116 and ac-
companying text.
137. Bible, supra note 1, at 312 (stating that "[i]n contrast to the standard
prescribed in Judge Sweet's decision, a standard requiring proof of actual dilution
through direct evidence tends to be more accurate and dispositive").
138. See id. at 302 (looking to arguments by certain members of Congress in
support of passing Act); see also Krafte-Jacobs, supra note 51, at 696 (acknowledging
that goal of legislature in passing Act was to provide uniform, nationwide solu-
tion); Serad, supra note 41, at 221-22.
139. Bible, supra note 1, at 301 (noting that state statute approach did not
offer consistent results). The "actual dilution" standard is more reliable and more
accurate than "likelihood" standard. See id. at 312.
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legislative intent to create greater predictability and uniformity in
trademark dilution cases nationwide. 140 Anti-dilution cases decided
since Ringling have followed its "actual dilution" interpretation, in-
dicating that state statute dependency is not the only feasible
solution. 1
41
VI. IMPACT
The court's decision in Ringling II could have repercussions for
both plaintiffs seeking preliminary injunctive relief and defendants
who would be enjoined under a "likelihood of dilution" stan-
dard. 42 One result of the "actual dilution" standard presumes that
a plaintiff does not have a valid dilution claim until the defendant's
mark has been on the market long enough to have measurably
harmed the senior mark's selling power. 143 This standard could be
detrimental to both parties since the owner of the senior mark must
wait to be actually harmed by the junior mark, and the owner of the
junior mark will inevitably spend money and time marketing its
product and corresponding mark, only to have them possibly taken
off the market.14 4
Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari to Ringling II, if
courts follow RinglingII, the Fourth Circuit's decision to require the
"actual dilution" standard under the Act will be reinforced. In the
entertainment industry, this could make the dilution standard less
140. See Krafte-Jacobs, supra note 51, at 694-96 (supporting "actual dilution"
standard but also doubting that Act will truly be uniform solution until significant
case involving Act reaches Supreme Court).
141. See I.P. Lund Trading ApS., Kroin Inc. v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 49-50
(1st Cir. 1998) (holding that actual harm is necessary in dilution case involving
competing products); see also NFL Props., Inc. v. Prostyle, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 665,
671 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (holding that tally of defendants' sales was not sufficient to
show "actual harm and cause" and that consumer survey should not merely
demonstrate mental association of marks); American Cyanamid Co. v. Nutraceuti-
cal Corp., 54 F. Supp. 2d 379, 392 (D.NJ. 1999) (adopting Ringling II standard and
holding that plaintiffs claim for dilution failed as a matter of law because plaintiff
did not offer any evidence of actual lessening of Centrum's selling power through
its mark's "capacity to distinguish goods or services").
142. See Bible, supra note 1, at 307-08 (noting that under Act, plaintiff may
only bring claim after actual dilution has occurred, whereas state statutes requiring
"likelihood of dilution" allow plaintiff to bring action before actual dilution has
occurred).
143. See id. at 308 (citing J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:1 (4th ed. 1996)).
144. See id.; see, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 188, 196
(S.D.N.Y. 1999), affd 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999). The court noted that at the
time of the action, Nabisco had already developed television and print advertising
and had approximately $3.4 million in inventory of its CatDog product ready for
distribution. See id.
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vague, creating a brightline rule. 145 Consequently, the sought after
judicial uniformity in federal dilution law could become a reality.' 46
In the entertainment industry, where image is not only central to
selling a product, but many times, is a major component of the
product itself, greater uniformity in trademark law could put an
end to the virtual circus created by state anti-dilution statutes by
offering more concrete guidelines to senior and junior mark own-
ers who wish to protect, preserve or launch programs or shows. 147
Christina M. Bidlingmaier
145. See Bible, supra note 1, at 302-03 (noting that uniformity in federal dilu-
tion law would make it possible for companies to develop "national brand manage-
ment strategies," while preventing forum shopping for state courts offering the
broadest protection).
146. See Krafte-Jacobs, supra note 51, at 696 (stating Congress' purpose in
passing Act); see a/so Welkowitz, supra note 50, at 20-22 (predicting that uniformity
would allow plaintiffs the opportunity to obtain nationwide relief and explaining
that greater certainty in dilution law would eliminate much of guesswork involved
in predicting how courts will rule on dilution issues).
147. For discussions of both the effect of dilution on the entertainment indus-
try as well as an explanation of the consistency of dilution standards used in courts,
see supra notes 13 and 55 and accompanying text.
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